We performed fMRI measurements in normal children to clarify which cortical areas are commonly involved in the mirror system (MS) and mentalizing, which areas are speci¢c for mentalizing, and whether children have the same neural networks for MS and mentalizing as adults. Normal children had the same neural networks for the MS and mentalizing as adults. Common activations were found in the superior temporal sulcus and the fusiform gyri, whereas mentalizing speci¢c activation was found in the medial prefrontal, temporal pole and the inferior parietal cortices. We suggest that mentalizing might evolve from a capacity to detect the motion of agents and to infer intentions. Further, mentalizing might require self-perspectives. NeuroReport 15:1483^1487
INTRODUCTION
Human beings have an inherent ability to attribute independent mental states, such as beliefs, prides, and desires, to self and others in order to explain and predict behaviors of others. This is referred to as a theory of mind, or mentalizing [1] . Several neuroimaging studies have identified the neural network for mentalizing in the paracingulate medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), superior temporal sulcus (STS) and the temporal pole in normal adult individuals [2] [3] [4] . Some have demonstrated abnormal neural activities in these areas in individuals with autistic disorders who lack mentalizing capacity [2, 4] .
In 1996, Rizzolatti et al. first reported mirror neurons in the monkey ventral premotor cortex, that discharge both when monkey performed a specific action and when it observed another monkey performing a similar action [5] [6] [7] . Their data indicated that monkey brain contains an action observation/execution matching system and suggested that even monkey has the lower-level theory of mind [5] [6] [7] . Following their first report, several monkey studies demonstrated that neurons in the STS (superior temporal sulcus) and intraparietal sulcus (IPS) also discharge during an observation of goal-directed action [5] [6] [7] . Neuroimaging studies also found the mirror system (MS) in areas of the human brain, such as Broca's area, premotor area, STS and the posterior parietal cortices (PPC) [8, 9] . Several investigators now consider that the MS could have an important role in action recognition, motor learning, imitation and understanding the meaning of the observed action, and be a prerequisite for the higher-level of theory of mind [6, 7] .
However, direct comparison of cortical activity patterns associated with the MS and mentalizing in the same subjects has not been done, and there are no neuroimaging studies of the MS or mentalizing in children. Because deficits or delayed development of the MS and mentalizing have been considered to be associated with disorders of socialization and communication in autistic spectrum disorders [1, 2] , the study of neural networks for the MS and mentalizing in children is important and interesting. To clarify following issues, we performed fMRI measurements during objectsrelated action observation and mentalizing task in normal children to determine which brain areas are common neural substrates for the MS and mentalizing and which brain areas are specific for mentalizing and whether normally developed children have the same neural substrates for the MS and mentalizing as those observed in previous studies in adults.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Eleven right-handed normal children (six boys and five girls, mean age 10 years, range 7-13) participated in this study. Written informed consent was obtained from all subjects and/or their guardians in accord with ethical guidelines in place at local ethical committee. We performed two sessions of fMRI (experiment 1 to detect MS and experiment 2 to detect the neural network for mentalizing) in each subject. The order of each experiment was counterbalanced across subjects with a 20 min interval.
Cerebral activation was measured with fMRI using blood oxygen level-dependent contrast. After automatic shimming, a time course series of 125 volumes was obtained using single-shot gradient-refocused echoplanar imaging (TR¼4000 ms, TE¼60 ms, flip angle¼901, inter-scan interval 4 s, in-plane resolution 3.44 Â 3.44 mm, FOV¼22 cm, contiguous 4 mm slices to cover the entire brain) with a 1.5 T Magnetom Vision plus MR scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) using the standard head coil. Head motion was minimized by placing tight but comfortable foam padding around the subject's head. The fMRI protocol was a block design with two epochs of task condition and control condition. Each fMRI session was performed in the same timing of epochs and measurement parameters. Each epoch lasted 20 s (equivalent to five whole-brain fMRI volume acquisitions). The first five volumes of each fMRI scan were discarded because of non-steady magnetization, with the remaining 120 volumes used for the analysis. In experiment 1, subjects were asked to carefully observe videotaped object-related hand actions (e.g. grasping a cup, picking up a hammer, manipulating a telephone) performed by another individual. We selected 52 daily necessities (e.g. an eraser, a pencil, a folk, etc.) as objects used in stimuli. These objects were positioned at horizontal center of the screen and a hand reached, picked-up and/or manipulated each object from the top right-hand corner of the screen. One stimulus lasted 4 s, therefore, subjects watched five stimuli per each task epoch. The observation of object-related hand actions was contrasted with the static hand, arm above the same objects used in the task period as a control condition. Each control stimulus also lasted 4 s, therefore, subject watched five stimuli per each control epoch.
The stimuli used in experiment 1 were similar to previous fMRI study of the MS [9] . Animations used in experiment 2 were modified for fMRI measurement but were essentially the same as stimuli that were originally developed and used in a behavioral study by Abell et al. [10] and subsequently used in previous PET studies conducted by Castelli et al. [3, 4] . The stimuli were presented using Windows Media player running on a PC and back projected onto a screen, B50 cm from the subject's head, using a 65536-color liquid crystal display and an overhead projector. The subjects viewed the screen through a mirror attached to the head coil. After experiment 2 subjects were presented each animation used and asked to tell the experimenter what they thought the triangles were doing. This procedure was performed outside the MR scanner. The verbal descriptions given after each animation were corded along four different dimensions, the intentionality, appropriateness, certainty and the length of each answer. Detail of the procedure and scoring for evaluation of behavioral data was identical to the previous PET study [3] .
Data analysis: Data were analyzed with Statistical Parametric Mapping software (SPM99, http//:www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Scans were realigned and EPI BOLD images were summed and co-registered to the subject's T1-weighted MR images. Then T1-weighted MR images were transformed to the standard stereotactic space of Talairach using a T1-weighted MR template [11] . The parameter for affine and quadratic transformation to the T1-weighted MR template that was already fit for Talairach space was estimated by least-squares means. This transformation was applied to co-registered EPI BOLD images. Data were then smoothed in a spatial domain (full width at half-maximum¼8 Â 8 Â 8 mm) to improve the signal to noise ratio. After specifying the appropriate design matrix, delayed box-car function as a reference waveform, the condition, slow hemodynamic fluctuation unrelated to the task and subject effects were estimated according to a general linear model taking temporal smoothness into account. Global normalization was performed using proportional scaling. To test hypotheses about regionally specific condition effects, the estimates were compared by means of linear contrasts of each control and task period. The resulting set of voxel values for each contrast constituted a statistical parametric map of the t statistic SPM {t}.
The existence of a common activation pattern in the mirror system and mentalizing was estimated by using a conjunction analysis. The specific activation associated with mentalizing was estimated by using an exclusive mask with the MS associated activations threshold at po0.05. To account for inter-individual variance, all group analyses were computed using a random-effects model [12] . Group analysis across subjects involved a one-sample t-test on the images generated by pooling over the session the individual contrasts of activation vs control, conjunction with activations of the MS and mentalizing, and mentalizing related activations exclusively masked by the MS related activations for each subject. The voxels and clusters of significant voxels were given a threshold of p.
RESULTS
Behaviorally, subjects attributed more intentionality to the characters' behavior during theory of mind animations (mean (7s .d.) score 14.772.7) than during random movements (0.871.6; paired t-test, po0.001). The length of descriptions for theory of mind animations (10.474.5) was longer than those for random movements (6.172.7; paired ttest, po0.001). There was no difference in the appropriateness or certainty.
Compared with the observation of object and static hands (control condition), the observation of object-related hand actions activated the left dorsal premotor cortex (PMdr), right parietal operculum, bilateral intraparietal sulci (IPS), bilateral superior temporal sulci (STS), bilateral fusiform gyri and the bilateral visual association areas (BA18, BA19; Fig. 1a, Table 1 ). Figure 1 shows activations associated with mentalizing. As compared to random movements, significant activations were noted in the right medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC, BA9), right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), bilateral STS (right dominant), right inferior parietal cortex (BA40, BA39), right temporal pole, bilateral fusiform gyri (BA37), bilateral visual association areas (BA18) and the left cerebellum (Fig. 1b, Table 1 ).
Bilateral STS, fusiform gyri and visual association areas (BA18) were commonly activated by both action observation and mentalizing (Fig. 1c, Table 1 ). On the other hand, the right MPFC, right inferior parietal cortex, and left cerebellum were recruited in only mentalizing (Fig. 1d, Table 1 ).
DISCUSSION
Our experiments were designed to identify the cortical areas associated with the MS and/or mentalizing in normally developed children. We found activations in the PMdr, parietal operculum, IPS and the STS during objects-related hand actions. The results well correspond with those of previous studies of human MS in adult subjects [8, 9] . Our study also replicated activations in the MPFC, temporal pole, STS and the T-P junction that have been considered to be crucial neural components for mentalizing [2] [3] [4] . The behavioral data indicated that all subjects well understand the meaning of theory of mind animations. These results indicate that normally developed children have fully developed neural substrates for the MS and mentalizing.
Significant activations associated with mentalizing were also noted in the bilateral fusiform gyri (right dominant) and left cerebellum. Although previous PET studies using essentially the same stimuli for mentalizing did not demonstrate cerebellar activation [3, 4] , we suggest that cerebellum also has an important role in mentalizing. Similar cerebellar activation associated with mentalizing was reported by Brunet et al. [13] and Calarge et al. [14] (Calarge reported right cerebellar activation). Recent neuroimaging studies have revealed that the cerebellum should be involved in higher cognitive functions, such as language and memory [15] . Furthermore, pathological and morphological studies of autism have demonstrated cerebellar abnormalities [16] . Since impairments of socialization and communication in autism may be explained by lack or delayed development of the mentalizing capacity, it is plausible that the cerebellum also contributes to mentalizing.
One aim of this study was to identify common cortical regions for the MS and mentalizing and to identify specific areas for mentalizing. Because the MS is considered to be a neural network for the lower-level of theory of mind and a prerequisite for the higher-level of theory of mind, we assumed that several regions should be common for both levels of theory of mind. On the other hand, even primates have the lower-level of theory of mind, however, the higherlevel of theory of mind seems to be unique to our species [17] . If so, there may be different neural components for the higher-level of theory of mind from those for the lower-level one. As expected, common activations in two systems were found in the posterior part of the STS in the temporal lobe and the fusiform gyri. Single-cell recordings in macaque and human neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that the STS region receives inputs from both the ventral and dorsal visual streams and processes perception of biological motion [18] . Because biological motion is important information to enable us to understand the intentions of others, it is not surprising that the STS is a common neural substrate for the MS and mentalizing. The fusiform gyrus has been considered to selectively process perception of faces, however, a recent fMRI study using similar stimuli to the present study suggested that the fusiform gyrus should have a general role in social perception including the perception of intentional behaviors as well as the STS [19] . We suggest that the higher-level of theory of mind might have evolved from capacity to detect the motion of animate agents and, subsequently, to infer intentions from actions which could be processed in the STS and fusiform gyrus.
Although the STS in the temporal lobe may be a common neural substrate for the MS and mentalizing, the most posterior part of the right STS, the inferior parietal cortex was recruited by only mentalizing. Previous studies of mentalizing suggested that activation in this region should be related to biological motion and/or a general role of detecting agency from visual cue rather than biological motion itself [2] [3] [4] . However, our study indicated that the STS in temporal lobe might be more involved in such processes than the parietal cortex. We speculate that the right inferior parietal activation in ToM may be associated with self-perspective, taking one's own perspective. Recently, Ruby and Decety [20] reported that the right inferior parietal cortex was recruited in distinguishing the perspective of the self and those of others. They suggested that the right parietal lobe have a determinant role in self-representation. Vogeley et al. [21] also reported the importance of the right inferior parietal area in the metarepresentation of ones own mental states. The mentalizing capacity is based on taking someone else's perspective, and projecting one's own attributes on someone else. During such mentalizing, one has to be aware of who the self is, in order to be able to imagine another person with the same neural resources as the self. In this context, the higher-level of theory of mind, such as understanding false belief and deception should require self-perspective. We assume that the right STS in the temporal lobe may be recruited in detecting agency of others, whereas the right STS in the parietal lobe may be recruited in detecting agency of one's own.
As well as the right inferior parietal cortex, the right MPFC and right TP were also recruited in only mentalizing. The activations in these regions are consistent findings amongst previous neuroimaging studies of mentalizing. We have no additional interpretation for these activities. However, we finally discuss the right dominancy in our results. Most studies demonstrated the left MPFC activation regardless of modalities of stimuli [2] [3] [4] , whereas our study demonstrated the right MPFC activation. A similar result was reported by Brunet et al. [13] . They suggested that the discrepancy in laterality reflects different nature of tasks (e.g. verbal or non-verbal) used in each study. However, stimuli and the experimental design used in this study were essentially the same as those of Castelli's PET studies demonstrating left MPFC activation [3, 4] . One possible explanation is that different laterality may be caused by the differences in spatial resolution of PET and fMRI studies, as PET data were smoothed with larger filters, such as 12 mm. The precise assignment of an activation of a midline structure to either hemisphere should be more difficult with PET than fMRI. Indeed, using fMRI measurement, Vogeley et al. [21] reported the right MPFC activation related to ToM task with verbal material. Furthermore, our finding of right hemispheric dominance for mentalizing is well concordant with results of neuropsychological studies in patients with right hemispheric lesions. According to lesion studies, patients with right hemispheric lesions demonstrate difficulties with communication, such as the understanding of metaphors, indirect meaning, the emotional-prosodic quality of expressions, and theory of mind [22] . The results support the right hemispheric dominancy in mentalizing.
